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21/08/2021

A retirada do Afganistão vista por Condoleezza Rice, ex-secretária de Estado dos EUA

«In the wake of Kabul’s fall, though, a corrosive and deeply unfair narrative is emerging: to blame the Afghans for how it all ended. The Afghan security forces failed. The Afghan government failed. The Afghan people failed. “We gave them every chance to determine their own future,” President Biden said in his address Monday — as if the Afghans had somehow chosen the Taliban.

No — they didn’t choose the Taliban. They fought and died alongside us, helping us degrade al-Qaeda. Working with the Afghans and our allies, we gained time to build a counterterrorism presence around the world and a counterterrorism apparatus at home that has kept us safe. In the end, the Afghans couldn’t hold the country without our airpower and our support. It is not surprising that Afghan security forces lost the will to fight, when the Taliban warned that the United States was deserting them and that those who resisted would see their families killed.

No — they didn’t choose the Taliban. They seized the chance to create a modern society where girls could attend school, women could enter professions and human rights would be respected.

No — they didn’t choose the Taliban. They built a fledgling democracy with elected leaders who often failed but didn’t brutalize their people as so many regimes in the region do. It was a government that never managed to tame corruption and the drug trade. In this, Afghanistan had plenty of company across the globe.

Twenty years was not enough to complete a journey from the 7th-century rule of the Taliban and a 30-year civil war to a stable government. Twenty years may also not have been enough to consolidate our gains against terrorism and assure our own safety. We — and they — needed more time.

We have understood this before. Technically, our longest war is not Afghanistan: It is Korea. That war didn’t end in victory; it ended in a stalemate — an armistice. South Korea did not achieve democracy for decades. Seventy years later, we have more than 28,000 American troops there in an admission that even the sophisticated South Korean army cannot deter the North alone. Here’s what we achieved: a stable equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula, a valuable South Korean ally and a strong presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Afghanistan is not South Korea. But we might have achieved a reasonable outcome with a far smaller commitment. More time for the Afghans didn’t have to entail combat troops, just a core American presence for training, air support and intelligence.

More time for us might have retained American intelligence and counterterrorism assets on the ground to protect our allies and our homeland from the reemergence of a terrorist haven. More time might have preserved our sophisticated Bagram air base in the middle of a dangerous region that includes Pakistan and borders the most dangerous country in the Middle East — Iran.

More time would have served our strategic interests.

We did not want to give ourselves or the Afghans more time. Understood. But we were in such a hurry that we left in the middle of the fighting season. We know that the Taliban retreats in the winter. Might we have waited until then and given the Afghans a little more time to develop a strategy to prevent the chaotic fall of Kabul?

Now we have to live with the consequences of our haste.»

Excerto de The Afghan people didn’t choose the Taliban. They fought and died alongside us, Condoleezza Rice, Secretária de Estado dos EUA de 2005 a 2009.

Leitura adicional para ajudar a colocar as coisas em perspectiva: entrevista ao Observador de Thomas Barfield

3 comentários:

Carlos Conde disse...


A descrição do crime através das palavras do criminoso.

Para histórias idênticas ler: A falência do BES contada por Ricardo Salgado.

Unknown disse...

Sugerir à senhora ( e foi do melhorzinho que "por lá" passou na era pós-Reagan...) a leitura da primeira das "Cartas de Inglaterra", do Ilustre Zé Maria - deve haver tradução...
Extraordinária a súbita mole de peritos domésticos especializadíssimos em "Afeganistõ"...E mais extraordinário ainda quando se referem "àquilo" como País...e com cara séria...
A falta que faz o Embaixador Cutileiro...e não só quanto ao Afeganistão...

Anónimo disse...

Toma os teus remédios, velhote.
Viva os Talibans.
Os Tallies sempre são melhor que uma ocupação...

IRF