Porquê a manobra putinesca? Uma explicação possível

Interrogou-se o outro contribuinte sobre o propósito do que, talvez para irritar um melga que por aqui tem pousado, ele baptizou de "palhaçada" de um "frouxo": «Putin apoia proposta de emenda constitucional que lhe permitiria continuar no poder até 2036».

A Economist adianta uma explicação que parece bastante plausível pelo que se conhece de Putin, da sua clique e da Rússia actual. Na sua forma mais sintética, a explicação é Putin «tem muitos inimigos, e muitos comparsas que dependem dele». Se for isso, mais que frouxo, Putin mostra a prudência de um maquiavel eslavo antecipando que afastado do Kremlin perderá os seus comparsas e os seus inimigos ficarão com as mãos livres para lhe aplicar a receita que ele lhes vem aplicando, seguindo a tradição russa.

Aqui vai um excerto de «Prisioneiro no Kremlin - Por que Vladimir Putin não se pode se reformar»

«Mr Putin implied that the world was too stormy a place for him to abandon his position. A former kgb agent, he defined his role not merely as the defender of the constitution (which he is busily rewriting), but “the guarantor of the country’s security, domestic stability and evolutionary development”—evolutionary because “Russia had its share of revolutions.” It hardly needed saying that he was the only man capable of averting such mortal dangers. Still, it was said, and by none other than Valentina Tereshkova, a famous Soviet cosmonaut who is now an mp aged 83. She was given the role of voicing the reset proposal, which was promptly approved by the president and the Duma.

All of this was part of a special operation that Mr Putin launched in mid-January when he first announced plans for constitutional changes. The process was murky and abrupt. So it was in keeping with the style of a former kgb man whose own ascent to power was a special operation plotted in the corridors of the Kremlin. “A group of fsb agents assigned to work undercover in the government of the Russian Federation is successfully fulfilling its task,” he quipped in his speech to the fsb (the successor to the kgb) in December 1999 upon being made prime minister. He became president the following year.

Since then he has conducted other special operations, such as the annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine in 2014, not to mention the expropriation of the oil-and-gas firm Yukos in 2004-06. Each of these operations was dressed up in legal procedure, be it a referendum in Crimea or a show trial in the case of Yukos. The constitutional change is no different.

Mr Putin says that the changes will come into effect only with the endorsement of the Constitutional Court (which he controls), and with the approval of the Russian people. They will vote, as it happens, on April 22nd—the birthday of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state who still lies in a mausoleum in Red Square. The vote is neither a referendum nor an election, and the whole process is as legally dubious as the referendum staged in Crimea. The fact that Mr Putin is expected to sign his constitutional amendment on March 18th, the sixth anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea, is revealing.

While Mr Putin’s intention of staying in power was never much in doubt, the timing and the rush with which the changes to the constitution have unfolded have been striking. Ekaterina Schulmann, a political scientist, attributes this in part to the mood of Russia’s elite, who were feeling nervous about their own future. Mr Putin’s cronies depend on him for their positions. Uncertainty about his plans makes them fearful of losing their money, status and possibly their freedom.

The aim of Mr Putin’s move, she reckons, is to eliminate the risk that the elite might agree on a successor. Such an agreement would turn Mr Putin into a lame duck. Sergei Sobyanin, the mayor of Moscow, noted on his personal website that “a president who cannot run for another term cannot be a strong figure by definition. A ban on the incumbent being re-elected is a destabilising factor both in domestic and foreign policy.”

But Mr Putin’s erratic and unconvincing performance over the past few months risks alienating the public. The fact that he wants to impose his plan on the Russian people does not mean he will succeed. Few countries are as capable of delivering surprises as Russia. His power-grab is taking place against the background of a stagnating economy and rampant corruption.

In the two years since Mr Putin’s most recent election in March 2018, trust in him has fallen from 60% to 35%. His foreign adventures no longer thrill the public. Even anti-Americanism, one of the staples of his ideology, is going stale. This is why the promised vote on April 22nd is likely to be a fraudulent affair. Rallies against the changes are likely to be banned, thanks to the convenient coronavirus.

Ella Paneyakh, a Russian sociologist, argues that the Kremlin has lost touch with society. Its channels of communication have been reduced to broadcasting propaganda, which is losing its effect. Even bribing people with their own money does not seem to work any more.

The only instrument left is repression, which the government has already shown a willingness to use. “The state has plenty of potential for repression and it can be used again and again, until it encounters a problem that cannot be resolved by force,” Ms Paneyakh says. Mr Putin’s constitutional coup and his growing reliance on repression rather than patronage or propaganda raises the cost of challenging him, reduces the chances of an orderly transfer of power and increases the risk of violence in Russia. All this in the name of stability.»