Já em diversas ocasiões sublinhei as consequências indesejadas que podem resultar (e no passado resultaram) de colocar a impressora dos bancos centrais a funcionar para «aditivar» a economia. Agora a coisa chama-se quantitative easing mas a lógica é a mesma.
Também já apontei os indícios dos danos colaterais das políticas do dinheiro abundante e barato que começam a ser visíveis onde essas políticas foram mais longe: Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. E começam a ser visíveis precisamente nos sectores onde a bolha implodiu em 2008.
Leia-se a este respeito o que escreve Simon Baptist, Chief Economist da Economist, na sua newsletter desta semana que reflecte bem o quanto ele gostaria de ter o melhor de dois mundos, o sol na eira e a chuva no nabal e o receio de ter chuva na eira e sol no nabal:
«House prices are occupying the minds of many central bankers right now, not to mention those of potential buyers. Property has undoubtedly been one place where all this liquidity from central banks has been going: the last few years have seen strong price growth in many markets, including Japan, the US, the UK, Australia, the UAE and China among many others. This price growth has tempered in recent months in a lot of places, with the pace of growth slowing in the UAE and prices even falling (slightly) in the UK. It's not all good news for those worried about bubbles though—house price growth is accelerating in Australia, where worries about a property price bubble are a key reason why interest rates aren't coming down, despite low inflation. A sudden or sizable fall in house prices would doom the already fragile recovery, as consumers would tighten their belts again.»
Sublinho: «Property has undoubtedly been one place where all this liquidity from central banks has been going».
Também e sobretudo do outro lado do Atlântico aparentemente nada foi esquecido nem aprendido a respeito da alavancagem que a Fannie Mae e o Freddie Mac introduziram no crédito subprime (a respeito destas «government sponsored enterprises» e do seu papel na crise ver este post de 2009). Vejamos agora o que se está a passar nos EU, segundo a Economist (que, contudo, recomenda a medicina):
«This week a consortium of federal agencies also announced new standards that would permit banks to securitise and sell mortgages without retaining a 5% stake - leaving them little incentive to maintain high lending standards. In 2011 these agencies had suggested that such securities should only include mortgages with a minimum deposit of 20% and monthly repayments of no more than 35% of the borrower’s income. In the end they raised the loan-to-income ratio to 43% and dropped the minimum deposit entirely. The reason for the weaker standard, they said, was the concern that “additional constraints on mortgage-credit availability” might “disproportionately affect LMI (low-to-moderate-income), minority or first-time homebuyers.” Whether the lack of constraints might disproportionately affect taxpayers, the regulators did not say».
Qual será o resultado de a Fannie Mae e o Freddie Macos bancos «ressegurarem» 100% das hipotecas dos bancos? Quem disse que desta vez vai ser diferente?
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