Outras marteladas.
Recapitulando:
O intervencionismo do BCE, que copiou com atraso a Fed e o BoE, adoptando o alívio quantitativo e as taxas de juro negativas ou nulas, desde o «whatever it takes» do Super Mario de Julho de 2012, é parecido como terapêutica com a sangria dos pacientes praticada pela medicina medieval para tratar qualquer doença, incluindo a anemia.
Recapitulando:
O intervencionismo do BCE, que copiou com atraso a Fed e o BoE, adoptando o alívio quantitativo e as taxas de juro negativas ou nulas, desde o «whatever it takes» do Super Mario de Julho de 2012, é parecido como terapêutica com a sangria dos pacientes praticada pela medicina medieval para tratar qualquer doença, incluindo a anemia.
Agora, com a inflação a caminho, as medidas para a conter, depois de mais de uma década de alívio quantitativo e em cima dos incentivos relacionados com a pandemia, do aumento do preço dos combustíveis e, por último, das consequências da invasão da Ucrânia, arriscam-se a criar uma recessão, como faz notar o texto seguinte da Economist.
«Uncle Sam has been on a unique path because of Mr Biden’s excessive $1.9trn fiscal stimulus, which passed in March 2021. It added extra oomph to an economy that was already recovering fast after multiple rounds of spending, and brought the total pandemic stimulus to 25% of gdp—the highest in the rich world. As the White House hit the accelerator, the Fed should have applied the brakes. It did not. Its hesitancy stemmed partly from the difficulty of forecasting the path of the economy during the pandemic, and also from the tendency of policymakers to fight the last war. For most of the decade after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 the economy was hung over and monetary policy was too tight. Predicting inflation’s return was for those who wore tinfoil hats.
Yet the Fed’s failure also reflects an insidious change among central bankers globally. As our special report in this issue explains, around the world many are dissatisfied with the staid work of managing the business cycle and wish to take on more glamorous tasks, from fighting climate change to minting digital currencies. At the Fed the shift was apparent in promises that it would pursue a “broad-based and inclusive” recovery. The rhetorical shift ignored the fact, taught to every undergraduate economist, that the rate of unemployment at which inflation takes off is not something central banks can control.
In September 2020 the Fed codified its new views by promising not to raise interest rates at all until employment had already reached its maximum sustainable level. Its pledge guaranteed that it would fall far behind the curve. It was cheered on by left-wing activists who wanted to imbue one of Washington’s few functional institutions with an egalitarian ethos.
The result was a mess which the Fed is only now trying to clear up. In December it projected a measly 0.75 percentage points of interest-rate rises this year. Today an increase of 2.5 points is expected. Both policymakers and financial markets think this will be enough to bring inflation to heel. They are probably being too optimistic again. The usual way to rein in inflation is to raise rates above their neutral level—thought to be about 2-3%—by more than the rise in underlying inflation. That points to a federal-funds rate of 5-6%, unseen since 2007.
Rates that high would tame rising prices—but by engineering a recession. In the past 60 years the Fed has on only three occasions managed significantly to slow America’s economy without causing a downturn. It has never done so having let inflation rise as high as it is today.»
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