SERVIÇO PÚBLICO: Da próxima vez também não vai ser diferente (13)

[Uma espécie de continuação de «Too big to fail» - another financial volcanic eruption in the making (1) e (2) e de «Da próxima vez também não vai ser diferente»]

Não por acaso Nouriel Roubini, economista e professor da New York University, é também conhecido por Dr. Doom - em 2006 Roubini antecipou em dois anos a crise de 2008 da qual ainda hoje estamos a lamber as feridas. É no mínimo uma razão para reflexão Roubini em 2018 antecipar uma crise semelhante para 2020. Leia-se o excerto seguinte (a parte mais focada na conjuntura global) do seu artigo Is the next financial crisis already brewing? no Financial Times:

«As we mark the tenth anniversary of the global financial crisis, there have been plenty of postmortems examining its causes, its consequences and whether the necessary lessons have been learnt. 

So it seems a pertinent moment to ask when the next recession and financial crisis will occur and why. The global expansion is likely to continue this year and next because the US is running large fiscal deficits, China is continuing stimulative policies and Europe remains on a recovery path. Yet by 2020, there are several reasons why conditions for a global recession and financial crisis may emerge.

(...) 

Then there are trade frictions with China, Europe and Nafta countries, which will increase even if they fall short of a full-scale trade war. These frictions are just symptoms of the much deeper rivalry to determine global leadership on the technologies of the future, but their effect will be to slow growth and increase inflation.

(...) 

If this is a set of policies that hurts the US, then expansion elsewhere will weaken for other reasons. China will be slow to deal with over-capacity and excessive leverage, while emerging markets — many of which are already fragile — will be further damaged by a higher dollar, weaker commodity prices and a less buoyant China. Although Europe has lost some momentum, rising trade tensions and the European Central Bank’s exit from its unconventional policies mean it will have lost more by 2020.

Then consider asset prices: most are frothy, if not in bubble territory. US and global equities are expensive, especially in the US where P/E ratios are 50 per cent above historic averages. In private equity valuations have become excessive, while government bonds yields are too low. 

Credit, especially high yield, is expensive given US corporate leverage is at historic levels. Real estate, both residential and commercial, is frothy around the world, while EM assets have already corrected as seen in the bear market in equities. But the correction, including in commodities and fixed income, will continue as clouds gather. Investors anticipating a slowdown in 2020 will reprice risky assets by the middle of 2019.

Given changes in the structure of markets since the financial crisis, once a correction occurs the risk of illiquidity and fire sales is more severe. There is less market making and warehousing activities by broker dealers, and the expansion of high-frequency trading has brought with it the risk of “flash crashes”. 

(...)

Finally, once this perfect storm occurs in 2020, the tools available to policymakers will be constrained. Fiscal policy is hampered by higher public debts, but returning to unconventional monetary policies may be thwarted by the bloated balance sheets of central banks. Bailouts will be run up against the populist mood and less solvent sovereigns. 

Unlike a decade ago, once the next economic and financial downturn occurs the policy tools available to reverse it will probably be less effective.»