Mitos (161) – O enterro discreto da mutualização da dívida pública

Em Julho do ano passado a Comissão Europeia criou um grupo de peritos (que incluiu Vítor Bento e um único alemão, esta discreta economista, beldade de quem o Impertinente parece ser admirador) para estudar e apresentar um relatório sobre fundo de mutualização da dívida e as eurobills. O relatório concluído a semana passada teve a seguinte conclusão global:

«Both a DRF/P (Debt Redemption Fund and Pact) and eurobills would have merits in stabilising government debt markets, supporting monetary policy transmission, promoting financial stability and integration, although in different ways and with different long term implications. These merits are coupled with economic, financial and moral hazard risks, and the trade-offs depend on various design options. Given the very limited experience with the EU’s reformed economic governance, it may be considered prudent to first collect evidence on the efficiency of that governance before any decisions on schemes of joint issuance are taken. Without EU Treaty amendments, joint issuance schemes could be established only in a pro rata form, and - at least for the DRF/P - only through a purely intergovernmental construction raising democratic accountability issues. Treaty amendments would be necessary to arrive at joint issuance schemes including joint and several liability, certain forms of protection against moral hazard and appropriate attention to democratic legitimacy.»

[Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills - Final Report submitted on 31 March 2014 – Conclusions]

Para quem tenha dúvidas na interpretação do texto em europês, recomenda-se a tradução para língua franca feita pelo Eurozone Blog EVRO INTELLIGENCE, especialistas na hermenêutica bruxelense:

«An expert group that raises lots of concerns and does not come to any conclusion is by far the most effective way to bury an issue. We conclude that the experts have done the job for which they were appointed.»